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1. Premises
Globalization is real. Of course, there is globaloney,
too, for example, when all the changes resulting from
the simultaneity of market openings, deregulations,
privatizations and accelerated technical change are
taken to be results of globalization. However, a new
structure of the world economy - supported by new in-
stitutional and technical possibilities - has developed
in the last 20 years. Globalization means that the links
and interdependencies between the units forming the
worldwide economic system have simultaneously in-
creased, lengthened and intensified. Globalization as a
process implies that events, decisions and activities in
one region of the earth have become increasingly im-
portant for agents in other, sometimes very far away re-
gions. Globalization can be observed in two dimen-
sions, extension and intensity. On the one hand, we are
observing processes which - in their spatial aspects -
take place globally. On the other hand, they imply an
increased intensity of relations, mutual influences and
dependencies. Globalization has consequences, not
just for its active proponents,but for almost everybody,
because it generates pressures on the whole environ-
ment of the (world) economy, which includes nation
states, subnational political and social structures and
institutions. In many OECD-countries, globalization
has at least contributed to the breakdown of institu-
tionalized,corporatist compromises which were estab-
lished during the "golden-age"-period of capitalist de-
velopment from the fifties to the mid-seventies. Swe-
den in the early 90s is perhaps the most drastic example
of the breakdown of one of these - more or less implic-
it - social contracts.The established procedures of wage
formation and, thus, macroeconomic regulation
(Moene/Wallerstein 1995) lost the support of the em-
ployers´ association, requiring a set of painful readjust-
ments and the finding of new compromises before the
background of a hugely increased unemployment rate.
The new structure and openness of the world econo-
my is not simply a result of economic forces, but also of
political decisions made by nation states. Its dynamic
requires not only economic innovations, but also ad-
justments in the political realm, especially - within na-
tion states - in social policies. So far, it is not clear what
new forms of institutionalized compromises (between
business and labour, shareholders and stakeholders,
welfare state clients and tax payers, etc.) will be estab-
lished. In Europe, several "models" are discussed, since
especially smaller European countries seem to be far-
ther advanced in finding ways to cope with the new
constellation. In terms of economic performance,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, and,
with a remarkable comeback, Sweden have been doing
very well, even given the recent downturn of the world
economy. By contrast, the "new economy" of the Unit-
ed States did not last too long.A tremendous increase in
income and wealth inequalities (Piggety/Saez 2003)
appears to have been the price paid for lowering unem-
ployment in trickle down fashion in the late 1990s.
There is an increasing awareness that the bursting of
the huge speculative bubble in financial markets is like-
ly to do a lot of harm in a society in which state guaran-
teed social safety nets are wide-meshed and - in Euro-
pean eyes - far too fragile.
Although advocates of strictly neoliberal  economic
policies1 have not been successful in European elec-
tions, alternatives to the neoliberal agenda are not well
defined. What worked in the smaller European
economies is not easily sorted out and even less easily
transferable to the larger ones. In part, as we will see,
this uncertainty about adequate responses to globaliza-
tion is due to the inability to distinguish between real,
imagined or anticipated impacts of globalization.
2. The Debate
The effects of globalization on the capacity of nation
states to preserve some leeway for autonomous deci-
sions about economic and social policies have been
controversial even before the term globalization be-
came fashionable. A proposition widely discussed al-
ready some twenty years ago was the so-called compen-
sation hypothesis.The increased openness especially  of
small economies to world market forces generated (or
threatened to generate) internal instability and insecu-
rity of employment. Governments responded with in-
creased social security efforts, thus inaugurating the
period of quickly expanding welfare states (Cameron
1978, Katzenstein 1985). However, apart from the
problem of sustaining growth in government spending
simultaneously with further integration into the world
economy, this compensating response to externally
generated insecurity is held to be increasingly difficult
to maintain under current conditions (Rodrick 1997).
With progressive globalization, the welfare state is itself
1 The neo-liberal project aims „to disable state intervention alto-
gether, restricting its economic functions to a minimum and
constraining economic policy by rules or delegating it to organs
that are not responsive to the political process. In this view the
state must be institutionally constrained so that it is unable to
yield to political temptations.“ (Przeworski 1996) Why the term
"neoliberal" is used for the very traditional shrink-the-state, free-
the-market position of the disciples of Hayek et al. is not ratio-
nally reconstructable.Paleoliberal (Alexander Rüstow) would be
more adequate.
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considered to be part of the problem of non- or malad-
justment, responsible for labour market rigidities.
This kind of argument in turn has provoked efforts
to show that there is no "one best way" in coping with
globalization.As an alternative to conservative supply-
side strategies, with their standard components of low
inflation, low taxes, balanced budgets, deregulation,
privatization and further opening to world markets,
the feasibility of well implemented and broadly sup-
ported social democratic supply side strategies has
been demonstrated (Boix 1998, Garrett 1998). Howev-
er, recently even the premise of all these arguments,
namely, that expanding welfare state programs were a
reaction to, or a complement of, increasing openness
has been under dispute.Rather than exogenous factors,
endogenous structural changes leading to increasing
tertiarization and its negative impact on employment
in "old" industries or agriculture in the 60s and early
seventies are held to be responsible for welfare state ex-
pansion and the concomitant political regulation of
labour markets (Iversen/Cusack 1998). According to
this analysis, outside forces, including the impacts of
globalization,continue to be much less important than
the endogenous dynamics of structural change.
Against this, the Cameron/Katzenstein line of argu-
ment is upheld by Minnich (2003:46f.) who finds that
„corporatism and globalization both increase equality
of income, lending support to the argument that, in the
most ´ globalized´ economies, domestic corporatist in-
stitutions mediate international market forces, thus
maintaining equality.“
By pointing to these controversies I want to empha-
size that there is not much of a common opinion con-
cerning the effects of globalization on labour markets
and their sociopolitical environments. This discord
mirrors the diversity of empirical evidence: Political re-
sponses to globalization are quite different in different
nation states. They are strongly influenced by tradi-
tions and institutions, including those of conflict reso-
lution between capital and labour. Thus, empirical evi-
dence does not confirm the view that „there is no alter-
native“ to the neoliberal agenda. It rather suggests that
responses to globalization have been diverse and path-
dependent.These paths correspond roughly to the pat-
terns suggested by established welfare regime typolo-
gies (Titmuss 1958, Esping-Andersen 1990): liberal,
conservative and social democratic welfare states have
reacted differently to globalization,according to differ-
ent priorities in terms of social values or ultimate polit-
ical goals. Iversen/Wren (1998) have argued that there
exists a "trilemma" for modern service economies be-
tween the goals of income equality, budgetary restraint
and high employment.Liberal welfare states opt for fis-
cal stability and high employment at the cost of steeply
increasing income inequality; conservative welfare
states opt for budgetary restraint and income equality
but have to tolerate high and persistent unemploy-
ment; social democratic welfare states sacrifice budget-
ary stability for high employment while maintaining a
high degree of income equality. However, while this is
an elegant post factum stylization of developments ob-
served in the 1970s and 80s it is not clear whether the
trilemma is real and the options chosen lead to stable
positions. In addition, the role of globalization in the
trilemma remains controversial. Thus, Schwartz
(2001) has argued that welfare states are in difficulties
not because of globalization,structural change and un-
employment (either as a consequence of technical
change or of Baumol´s disease) but rather as a conse-
quence of the politics of deregulation and privatiza-
tion.They have eliminated non-welfare state sources of
social security, such as employment security and wage
augmenting  rents in public sectors or state sponsored
and run monopolies (mainly in energy and telecom-
munications industries). Because of „stranded invest-
ments“ (Schwartz 2001: 35),capital owners suffered in-
come losses, too. All these losses led people to turn to
the state for compensation. However, since welfare
states have lost income sources, too,and are under pres-
sure to lower taxes and stop cross subsidiarization, their
ability to provide protection has declined.
In such a perspective, globalization is less the true
cause of increased general insecurity and more a
metaphor for externalizing and anonymizing what is
really caused by deregulation and privatization. How-
ever, let´s look at arguments about the effects of global-
ization.
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3. Fears
One characteristic of the public debate about global-
ization is that it is rarely based on empirical analysis of
observable effects of globalization. The fact that some
states have succeeded in combining economic open-
ness and strong welfare programs allows for some care-
ful optimism not only with respect to economic gains,
but also with respect to the continuing "possibility of
politics". By contrast, the more typical stance in the
globalization debate is to highlight the breaks, ruptures
and dramatic changes which add up to pessimistic sce-
narios of things to come.
Evidently,most of these pessimistic scenarios are in-
tended as self-defeating prophecies: Doom is certain if
you don´t change your ways, so you better change them
quickly. Less dramatically, but in more detail, the fol-
lowing negative effects of globalization are feared:
(1) On labour markets of rich countries the in-
creased competition of low-wage-countries on mer-
chandise and service markets results in increased
unem-ployment, degradation of working conditions
and decreasing legal protection of employees. This
pressure is primarily directed towards the low-skilled
who either experience higher unemployment or wage-
losses (or both).
(2) State organized social protection systems are
under pressure from two angles.On the one hand,wage
costs are to be lowered and social security contribu-
tions are a primary target for such cost cutting. As they
have resulted in a widening gap between gross and net
wages they are not only experienced as a burden by
business - which always has an interest in cost reduc-
tion - but also by employees. For them, the cost-benefit
balance of social security (in all its aspects: old-age-,
health-,unemployment-,accident-, long-term-care in-
surances) has deteriorated. This is the inevitable out-
come of a shrinking wage share in national income
and/or a growing number of welfare state clients due to
high and persistent unemployment. This negative
trend in the cost-benefit-balance of welfare state pro-
grams is likely to continue given aging populations in
the rich countries. On the other hand, nation states
have more or less reduced their economic policies to
competition for investments. If international investors
consider high levels of welfare state provision either as
an obstacle to high capital returns or as an indicator of
fiscal irresponsibility, governments are under pressure
to cut back welfare state programs, with the risk of get-
ting drawn into a race to the bottom.
(3) Globalization involves not only competition in
terms of wage costs and, therefore, pressure to cut back
welfare state programs, but also competition between
tax systems. The distribution of tax burdens can no
longer be organized according to ability-to-pay, the
principle underlying progressive income taxation, but
only according to the ability to avoid paying taxes. The
higher the (potential) mobility of tax payers, the lower
the tax burden. This leads to the fear that nation states
will lose so much of their taxing power that a serious
underprovision with public goods is imminent.
(4) Global financial markets threaten nation states
with similar losses of sovereignty. Extremely accelerat-
ed, voluminous and effectively world-wide around-
the-clock transactions reduce the leverage of estab-
lished economic policy instruments, especially of tra-
ditional macroeconomic stabilization and employment
policies. Deficit spending to stimulate aggregate de-
mand is difficult in open economies and requires close
coordination with monetary policy. But autonomous
adjustments of interest and exchange rates are no
longer feasible tools of governments, even where they
are not yet placed in the hands of independent (and in
the Euro-zone: supranational) monetary authorities.
(5) A parallel to the race to the bottom social policy is
feared to take place in environmental protection poli-
cies (eco-dumping), since high protection standards
cannot be maintained if too many other economies op-
erate with lower standards and thus with lower costs
(the "how can I be good when everybody else is bad"-
syndrome).
"As borderless capital moves relentlessly around
the globe, ignoring national boundaries, it in-
evitably creates a competition not only over mar-
kets but over public policy. Lower wages and limit-
ed social policies in host countries tempt the glob-
alizers to use these advantages, to pressure higher
wage countries to lower them, thin the social con-
tract, cut back on environmental protection, re-
duce social security, and trim health and safety on
the job. Leveraging is what this amounts to. It is a
term that applies equally to the financial attrac-
tions of globalization and to public policies, as one
nation´s more limited social contract is used as an
argument for reducing the social contract in the
most highly advanced countries. Alongside inter-
national trade in products, services and money is
the import and export of public policies. This
yields a race to the bottom, a competition over
which country can offer the lowest wages and the
most limited social policies." (Wachtel 1999: 4) 
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Opposed to these propositions are direct counter-
propositions on the one hand, arguments for positive,
compensating effects of globalization on the other hand.In
what follows, I do not want to address fears about eco-
dumping (5) at all.Concerning vanishing opportunities to
tax (3),I will just point to some counter-evidence.Mainly,
I want to discuss the issues of low wage competition and di-
minishing social protection (fears 1 and 2), a discussion
which will have implications for the question of the con-
tinuing feasibility of national economic policies.Concern-
ing fears (1) and (2) I will hold against them,first, that un-
employment in Germany is as high and persistent as it is
not because of globalization but mostly for internal (or
Euro-zone internal) reasons (section 4);secondly,that un-
employment is not so much the result of excessive welfare
state protection, but rather of the economic turmoils fol-
lowing German unification (section 5). It is true that the
cost-benefit balance of welfare state programs has deterio-
rated, in the sense that contributors/tax payers get less for
what they pay.However,this is not an effect of globalization
(or, as another popular prejudice has it, of ageing) but
rather the result of using welfare state programs to cushion
the effects of the disastrous deindustrialization in East Ger-
many.Welfare state programs are predominantly financed
by West Germans in dependent employment2.In pointing
out such internal causes of unemployment and fiscal strain
I do not want to dispute that globalization is real and exerts
pressures on the German labour market and welfare state.
But the order of magnitude of these effects is,thus far,quite
secondary compared to endogenous factors which are re-
sponsible for the internationally almost unique inability of
Germany to reduce unemployment to a tolerable level3.
If this reading of the situation is correct, it follows that
most of the current public emphasis on the necessities of
cost-reducing welfare state reforms,of deregulation,of in-
creasing flexibility to enhance German competitiveness in
the global economy amounts to barking up the wrong tree.
The specter of merciless market forces unleashed by glob-
alization is rhetorically inflated to push for an extra dose of
business friendly supply side policies. Some irony is in-
volved, however. If people believe that the specter is real,
they will demand more, not less security. In that way, the
embeddedness of the German labour market in welfare
state programs may ultimately be strengthened as a reac-
tion to the perceived – rather than the real - threats of glob-
alization.Thus,a misguided debate may have unintended
results. The issue is not simply one of opposing globaliza-
tion and demands for flexibilization on the one hand and
welfare state induced rigidities causing unemployment on
the other hand.Rather,the real issue is whether it is possible
to use welfare state programs to enable, support and
strengthen flexible responses to new market demands
("Flexicurity" is the term coined by the Dutch for such a
strategy).
Before turning to unemployment, some brief remarks
on taxes and public spending (fear 3): That nation states
are losing their capacity to tax is not something everybody
fears, of course. However that may be, in view of govern-
ment revenue and spending shares which, in a slowing
trend, are still growing, but hardly ever falling, such fears
seem to be misplaced.In OECD countries in 1999,total tax
receipts (including social security contributions) averaged
37.3% of GDP, after 35.6% in 1990 and 32.8% in 1980.
Germany´s tax burden as a share of GDP was 37.7% in
1999, slightly above the OECD and clearly below the EU
average (41.6%).German taxes are exceptional only inso-
far as social security contributions amount to a very high
36,6% of total tax receipts (a share second only to the
Netherlands` 39.3%),whereas the German share of corpo-
rate income taxes (4.8%) is far below the OECD (8.8%)
and EU (8.7%) averages (OECD 2002a: 38f.). The latter
numbers are interesting.The rather uniform public opin-
ion that the German tax burden is intolerably high must ei-
ther be simple disinformation or rest on the rather naive
conviction that nominal tax rates correspond to effective
tax rates. That is not the case. Apart from social security
contributions, German taxes are comparatively low. Re-
markably in terms of bias,the contribution of wealth taxes
to total tax revenues is considerably higher (above 10%) in
the "liberal" regimes of the USA,Canada,Japan and Great
Britain than the 2.7% share of taxes on wealth in Ger-
many4. While overall tax burdens still seem to be growing,
tax avoidance or evasion have become major international
sports,with an increasing share of corporate profits accru-
ing not where production and sales take place but where
taxes are lowest5. In short, the "fear" that nation states lose
their capacity to tax is unfounded.Rather, tax burdens are
more likely to be shifted from the more to the less mobile
and,by implication,from the more to the less well-off.
2 Formally, employers pay a considerable share of social insurance
contributions. I am assuming, in accordance with most analysts
of incidence, that social security contributions are in the last in-
stance paid by wage and salary earners.
3 That France and Italy have a similar unemployment record
seems to be due to a spill-over effect: The unemployment gene-
rating monetary regime of the Bundesbank in the early 90´s was
shaped by the internal German situation, but extended in its
reach to cover the EMS countries. The European Central Bank
has continued the tradition of using high interest rates preemp-
tively.
4 1997 OECD tax data according to Neue Zürcher Zeitung Nov. 9,
1999
5 From the survey of globalisation and tax in The Economist (Ja-
nuary 29, 2000)
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4. Globalization and
Unemployment
A standard explanation of unemployment refers di-
rectly to globalization. Newly opening global markets
induce national economies to specialize increasingly in
products which allow for greatest comparative advan-
tages.Countries with high-skilled but expensive labour
forces will produce with higher capital intensities, those
with cheaper, low-skilled labour forces will produce
with higher labour intensities. The old theorem on the
equalization of factor prices explains the adjustment
processes resulting from such a competitive constella-
tion. "The import of labour intensive goods from low-
wage countries has the same effect on the internal labour
market as the direct immigration of labour would have:
an expansion of labour supply." (Donges 1998: 3, my
translation H.G.). The employment chances of the low-
skilled in rich countries are particularly damaged under
such circumstances because poorer countries will use
their comparative advantage to produce labour intensive
goods given the availability of cheap and low-skilled
labour, whereas richer countries will use less, but high-
skilled labour relative to capital. Demand for the high-
skilled will remain relatively high there, so that either
the wage distance between high-skilled and low-skilled
will increase or the latter will suffer higher unemploy-
ment (Wood 1995). Wage dispersion increased espe-
cially in the USA and the United Kingdom. Where this
form of adjustment was blocked - as it was in Germany
- by union power and/or welfare state programs pre-
venting the downward adjustment of reservation
wages, the theory predicts higher and persistent unem-
ployment, particularly of the low-skilled.
This straightforward textbook explanation of Ger-
man unemployment has been very popular among
those who are either interested in lower wages or be-
lieve that lower wages can lead to increased employ-
ment. It seems to go well with the fact that US (and, to a
lesser extent, British) unemployment decreased along
with increasing wage inequality and stagnating real
wages for the low and medium skilled, whereas the
German labour market showed no significant increase
in wage inequality and unemployment increased or
persisted on a high level. However, closer analysis has
resulted in evidence which contradicts this textbook
wisdom: Non-employment of the low-skilled was
found to be as high in the US as in Germany,despite the
extensive low-wage labour market segment in the US
(Nickell 1998). If one can assume that both countries
experience similar pressures from globalization, it re-
mains puzzling that increasing real wages of the low-
skilled in Germany did not lead to much higher unem-
ployment for them.
One possible explanation suggests that low skills do
not mean the same thing in the two countries. Both
Nickell (1998) and Freeman/Schettkatt (1999) have
demonstrated that educational attainment levels in the
lowest skill segment are significantly higher in Ger-
many than in the USA. This is mostly due to the so
called "dual system" in Germany.It combines school at-
tendance with an apprenticeship for the vast majority
of those who will work in the lower range of the labour
market. The difference in educational systems could
thus explain why relative unemployment for the low-
skilled in Germany is lower than in the USA. The as-
sumed globalization induced shift of demand in favor
of the higher-skilled in rich countries would affect the
German low-skilled less than those in the USA.
But such a plausible additional argument does not
completely solve the puzzle:Why hasn´t the breakdown
of US real wages in the early 1980s at least compensated
for the low skill differential?
One possible explanation is that the skill-biased-de-
mand-for-labour theory, while theoretically sound, is
not relevant because  the development of world trade
and investment was quite different from what was as-
sumed. There is not much convincing evidence that
globalization has resulted in increased competition be-
tween high and low wage countries. The lion´s share of
world trade takes place between rich countries.Accord-
ing to Thygesen et al. (1996: 17f.) the share of exports
into non-OECD, non-OPEC countries in 1992
amounted to 2.55% of GDP in the USA, 3.16% in  Eu-
rope and 3.73% in Japan, with corresponding import
shares of 3.39% for the USA, 3.26% for Europe and
2.22% for Japan.A look at more recent world trade data
(WTO 2003) suggests that although regional trade
blocks such as the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN have lead to
a stronger integration of some of their less developed
members into world trade the overall pattern is still tri-
lateral, with much of Asia, Central/Eastern Europe and
Russia, and most of Africa and Latin America (except
Mexico) remaining outside the global triangle formed
by North America, Western Europe, Japan and the
Tiger states.A similar constellation holds for foreign di-
rect investments. Most of them take place in the
OECD-arena6. Thus, 85% of the capital newly invested
6 From 1984 to 1994, 95% of all FDIs came from fourteen OECD
countries.The positive employment effects of these investments,
however, were not considerable, since 4/5 of them are mergers
and acquisitions (Bundesbank 1997: 74, 79).
Globalization and the German Labor Market8
by German business in foreign countries from 1998 to
2001 went to rich OECD countries (Bundesbank 2003:
57). Given the relatively small volume of trade and in-
vestment flows between poor and rich countries, it is
not likely that they will have more than a secondary
amplifying effect on unemployment in rich countries.
Considering the evidence on trade and investment
flows one cannot escape the impression that globaliza-
tion so far is mainly a trilateral affair between the rich
countries of North America, EU-Europe and Japan.
There are differences in wage costs between these coun-
tries, but in the sectors exposed to world market com-
petition, they do not appear to be large enough to de-
rive the considerable differences in unemployment
from them, especially if wage costs are seen, as they
should be, together with productivity. Higher produc-
tivity can compensate for the competitive disadvantage
of higher wages. This is the standard (and, I think, cor-
rect) argument of German industrial unions whenever
the loss of competitiveness of German industry is at-
tributed to excessively high wages. German experience
in the 1990s suggests that exchange rates have been a
much more important factor for growth than wage
costs: The expected positive employment effects of
wage restraint in the mid 90s were neutralized by the
increased value of the DM, whereas the Euro-weakness
against the dollar fed an export boom that clearly im-
proved the German labour market situation -- until the
US bubble burst.
To sum up this section: It is likely that external forces
influenced the German labour market by adding some
upward pressure to given high and persistent unem-
ployment. However, globalization which presumedly
affects all OECD economies as an external force, with
its impact varying with their degree of openness and
their structural composition, cannot explain the con-
siderable differences between employment develop-
ments in the USA and Germany.
5. Eurosclerosis and Reforms
The German unemployment record could only be
attributed to globalization if Germany had particularly
maladapted to globalization pressures. Indeed,accord-
ing to one of the major streams of public (or published)
opinion precisely this appears to be the problem. Ger-
man institutions,especially those regulating  the labour
market, are held to be too rigid in face of the changing
requirements imposed on the German economy by
world wide competition, whether it be on product
markets or in the race for foreign direct investments.
Although German export firms are doing much better
than those serving the domestic market and although
Germany has attracted a larger share of foreign direct
investments (measured relative to GDP) than any other
G7 economy (OECD 2002a: 56f.), this supply-side ar-
gument is still emphasized by conservative economists,
business leaders and the free market advocates among
politicians. Nowadays market liberals can be found in
all major German political parties - except perhaps the
PDS - from high density among the Free Democrats to
one or the other self-styled economic expert among the
Greens. They all believe that the major obstacles to a
smooth coping with globalization are labour laws, wel-
fare state programs and union power. Nonetheless, a
considerable part of the Social Democrats and the rep-
resentatives of the Christian labour movement among
the Christian Democrats have for many years acted as a
political blocking coalition, defending welfare state
programs and unions. Whatever the outcome of this
conflict, the intense debate about "Eurosclerosis", the
disease held to be responsible for high German (and
French and Italian) unemployment, has been largely
ideological, based on strong convictions and little evi-
dence. The Eurosclerosis story is subject to the same
criticism as the dramatic globalization scenarios: Just
as the effects of globalization are likely to be far too
small to explain the unemployment differences be-
tween pre-globalization and globalization times, insti-
tutional rigidities cannot account for the different em-
ployment performances of liberal and non-liberal
regimes. European labour market rigidities have exist-
ed long before the early to mid 1990s, when the unem-
ployment gap between the USA and the big European
economies opened.Even given different speeds and ex-
tents of deregulation, its effects cannot possibly explain
more than a small fraction of unemployment differ-
ences.Empirical estimates of the impact of labour mar-
ket rigidities on unemployment (for surveys see
Gregg/Manning 1997, Nickell 1997) have failed to sup-
port the Eurosclerosis argument. Various indicators of
flexibility do not correlate significantly with unem-
ployment - except for a positive correlation between
the duration of unemployment benefits and the unem-
ployment rate. Thus, the share of the difference in un-
employment between the USA and Germany which is
empirically explainable by the factors held responsible
for Eurosclerosis is at best small, implying that the re-
forms held to be necessary for higher flexibility will not
significantly contribute to a reduction of unemploy-
ment. Nonetheless, the Eurosclerosis explanation of
labour market problems is upheld by German business
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associations and most media, continuing a narrative
which first emerged in the late 80s: The flexibility of
wages, working times, job entry and exit is held to be
too low, the incentives structured by welfare state pro-
grams reward passivity and are not conducive to more
flexibility, the system of wage bargaining is too central-
ized,etc. (For a recent list of such complaints see Frank-
furt Voice, Deutsche Bank Research, 23.12. 2002).
Against the rigidity stereotype, major unions point
to the concessions they have made (or been forced to
make) during most of the 1980´s and 90´s: more flexible
working times, more opening clauses in semi-centrally
negotiated wage contracts,new patterns of partial early
retirement, more jobs without legal protection against
dismissal, etc. The unions, however, have little public
voice and - in Germany as elsewhere - are under the
pressure of eroding membership, partly due to struc-
tural economic change, partly due to unemployment,
partly due to rapid loss of members in East Germany
(where union membership was exceptionally high and
members were to a large extent simply taken over by
West German unions after 1989).
Compared to the almost frozen lines of conflict be-
tween business and labour, there is some movement on
the political scene. The familiar order of left and right,
of union or business friendly political allegiances has
been disturbed recently, not as an immediate effect of
the election of 1998, with the Social Democrats form-
ing a new government with the Greens, but after the
struggle for dominance in the SPD had been won by
Schröder and Lafontaine had resigned in 1999.
The tax and welfare state reform projects introduced
since then by the government are difficult to distin-
guish from what the Kohl government had proposed
earlier, only to be blocked by the Social Democrats.
Some of these reforms are explicitly intended to adjust
German institutions to the new globalized economy,
enhancing the competitiveness of German business.
Nominal7 income tax rates will be reduced.As a „green“
element, some of the burden of social security contri-
butions on wages was to be shifted to energy consump-
tion by means of "ecological" taxes, thus helping to keep
the wage bill low despite expected increases in spending
on pensions and health.The income replacement value
of pensions will be further decreased and private provi-
sion for old-age income is encouraged and subsidized.
Privatization of publicly owned enterprises will contin-
ue. These reforms may have improved supply side con-
ditions for firms,but have neither changed labour mar-
ket nor general macroeconomic conditions to the ex-
tent required to reduce unemployment more than in-
crementally. Of course, one can always argue that re-
forms have not gone far enough, but that is always true
if the objectives are as open-ended as in the neo-liberal
project.
Therefore, if the aim really is to reduce unemploy-
ment, it is unlikely that the Schröder government can
be satisfied with pushing through the conservative sup-
ply side reforms that the Kohl government failed to ac-
complish. It will need to add an effective Social demo-
cratic and Green touch to be reelected.This seems to be
far more difficult than expected. The politically much
heralded ”Bündnis für Arbeit" (Coalition for Work), a
revival of the top level corporatist negotiating triangle
of the 70´s (Konzertierte Aktion),has not come up with
any major suggestions on how to get the unemployed
back to normal paid work. Although the German gov-
ernment - perhaps imitating New Labour in Britain -
tends to underline its positive attitude towards busi-
ness, it has not yet been able to perform the function
expected from the state side in such triangular negotia-
tions, namely, to prevent the deterioration of bargain-
ing games into prisoner´s dilemma situations.Business
and labour still seem to pursue mainly non-coopera-
tive, loss avoiding (maximin) strategies. After the
breakdown of the unification boom in 1992 and the
failure of their own high-wage strategy of integrating
East Germany, unions tried to exchange wage restraint
for employment generating investments. When suffi-
cient investments were not forthcoming, they in-
creased wage demands,only to face a worsening invest-
ment situation. Partly, this could be a matter of timing.
Unions see profits taking off but by the time they are
ready to demand their share, profits have dwindled
again,as in 1999/2000.As collective actors business and
labour rationally distrust each other to the extent that
neither side is willing to enter closer cooperation by
making concessions now that can only be rewarded
later. At least in theory, the government could help
overcome these barriers by backing the necessary
agreements with political guarantees. In practice,noth-
ing noteworthy has resulted from such neocorporatist
consultations so far. As to the future, the scope of par-
ticipants and the agenda of „Bündnis für Arbeit“ is not
comprehensive enough (Lehmbruch 1999) to create
the new „social pact“ (Rhodes 2001) necessary to over-
come German self-paralysis.
Insufficient scope also is the problem of the „Hartz-
Kommission“, a rather hastily constituted body with
7 It is too early to say whether the effective total income tax rate
will decrease, too. The current German tax system features high
progressive tarrifs, but, as compared to the rest of Europe, has
low effective direct tax rates, which are regressive because of
loopholes open mostly for high income earners.
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the task of suggesting labour market reforms. The re-
sulting suggestions are clearly shaped by the idea that
German unemployment is mostly a mismatch prob-
lem. Mismatch can be tackled by improving labour
market services to bring together jobseekers and firms
with job openings. However, a short look at German
Beveridge curves (Nickell et al., 2001: 52) – relating job
openings to unemployment – shows not only that job
openings are a rare item, but also that unemployment
rose without any indication of a worsening perform-
ance of the labour market. „The main message trans-
mitted by the Beveridge curves for France and Ger-
many goes squarely against the cliché that high and per-
sistent unemployment is entirely or mainly a matter of
worsening functioning of the labour market. It is pre-
cisely in France and Germany that there is no sign of a
major unfavourable shift of the Beveridge curve dur-
ing the period of rising unemployment.“ (Solow
2000:5).
6. Endogenous causes of German
unemployment
Pursuing an argument developed by Scharpf (1999),
who found that Germany lacks employment opportu-
nities for low skilled service workers, Manow/Seils
(2000) again propose that the German unemployment
problem is due to rigidities in the labour market at the
low-skill end.Once more,rigidities are being attributed
to the welfare state (high wage replacement and social
assistance rates, high tax wedge between gross and net
wages). But, as Howell (2002) has argued, the rigidity
thesis would imply that countries as the UK and the
USA with their flexible, low wage labour markets – in
other words: a good share of working poor - have lower
relative unemployment rates of the low- vs. high-
skilled. As Howell has shown for the early 1990s, this
was not the case. And it still isn´t. In 2000, the ratios of
low skill over high skill unemployment (defined ac-
cording to educational achievement: less than upper
secondary/upper secondary education) were highest in
liberal countries with highly flexible labour markets
(Ireland 2.7, Switzerland 2.5, USA 2.2, UK 2.0). Con-
servative Austria (2.1) was an outlier. There was no
specific ordering among „rigid“ conservative (Ger-
many, France, Belgium 1.8, Italy 1.4) and employment
oriented social democratic (Finland 1.4, Sweden 1.5,
Denmark 1.6) labour market regimes (own calculation
based on OECD 2002: 316f.)
In short, the skill-bias and mismatch story of unem-
ployment so popular in Germany does not fit the evi-
dence, neither in the globalization, biased technical
change or low productivity services variants.
Why then is unemployment in Germany so high and
persistent? At the end of the 1980s, before unification, it
looked as if the supply side policies which the Kohl gov-
ernment had gradually adopted from 1982 onward
would turn into a success. The share of social expendi-
tures had, for the first time since 1974, sunk below 31%
of GDP (BMA 1999, Tab. 7.2). There was even a slight
budget surplus in 1989. Productivity and employment
growth were quite satisfactory. Unemployment had de-
creased below 6% for the first time since 1982.Only high
interest rates gave some cause for concern. Then came
unification. In the ensuing years, state expenditures in-
creased rapidly. The public debt doubled from 1990 to
1996. Taxation was not adequately adjusted to the new
expenditure requirements. In effect, the tax burden net
of social security contributions (as a share of GDP) was
slightly lower in the 1990´s than in the late 1970´s and
80´s. But its distribution changed, so that the main
sources for financing German unification were the taxes
and social security contributions of middle and lower
income households. Income taxes on wages and salaries
and social security contributions - which are payable
only by those in dependent employment up to an in-
come ceiling - increased in 1991 by 13.2%8. With the
help of the Bundesbank, interest rates increased, so that
the already highly indebted public sector slipped into a
fiscal squeeze. When the short lived unification boom
collapsed, the resulting recession was not amenable to
supply side tools. Given the high interest burden the
budget could not be consolidated although the govern-
ment stabilized state consumption and reduced public
investment and employment. Rather, the attempts to
slow the increase in the public debt depressed aggregate
demand, an effect that was amplified by stagnating or
slightly shrinking net disposable wages and salaries.
Without policies of stimulating aggregate demand via
deficit spending, there remained two possibilities to im-
prove overall economic prospects (and thus reduce un-
employment): Aggregate demand could be stabilized or
increased either by increased spending out of capital in-
comes or by increased foreign demand. Relying on ex-
ports, a sort of macroeconomic mercantilism, is a Ger-
man tradition.Although profits quickly recovered from
the recession of 1993, the hope that increased profits
8 This caused net real incomes from dependent employment to de-
crease slightly in 1991.
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would translate into increased investment and - via in-
creasing effective demand - into growing employment
was not fulfilled. On the export side, restrictive mone-
tary policy together with the crisis of the European cur-
rency system (1992) led to an appreciation of the DM,so
that exports - helped by wage restraint - started to boom
only since 1996. Even under the favorable conditions of
1997/8,however, export growth alone was not sufficient
to stimulate domestic demand. The investments re-
quired to sustain a rate of growth sufficient to more than
marginally reduce unemployment simply did not take
place. Thus, German unemployment has more and
more become „capital shortage“-unemployment: In-
vestments are too low and slow to create the number of
work places sufficient to absorb the unemployed. There
can be no doubt that the share of national income going
into investments has fallen in the long run, from more
than 20% in the early 1970s to a catastrophic all time low
of less than 4% in 2002 (calculated according to BMGS
2003 tables 1.8,1.19).
Schalk et al. (1997: 11) estimated that „capital short-
age“-unemployment in West Germany has increased
from 3.5% in 1980 to 5 to 6% unemployment in the mid
1990s, where „capital shortage“-unemployment is esti-
mated as the rate of unemployment that will persist
when a normal rate of capital utilization is reached.
Given the further deterioration of the investment ratio
in the last years, the share of unemployment due to cap-
ital shortage will have increased considerably.Apparent-
ly, investments did not fall as a consequence of falling
profits. From 1991 to 1998, German corporations were
able to increase their returns before taxes by 41% or 5%
p.a., whereas total net investment was reduced after the
1993 recession and did not return to earlier levels, re-
maining about 10% below the 1991 level in 1998.Invest-
ments of non-financial corporations were reduced even
more, dropping more than 50% in the early nineties,
thus exacerbating the recession (Bundesbank, Dec 99:
54f.).German unemployment has to be explained by ex-
plaining German investment behavior.
7. Globalization and Investment
If globalization has a significant impact on the Ger-
man labour market, we will find it in this context. It is
hardly the case that German enterprises lost competi-
tive strength internationally by losing markets in zero-
sum-fashion to competitors from low-wage countries
in too many industries. Rather, it seems more plausible
to assume that the increasing density and speed of in-
ternational communication and the ease of capital
transfers led to larger shares of capital being channelled
into financial and/or foreign markets. Partly, this
change took place for the simple reason that a regime of
flexible exchange rates requires export oriented enter-
prises to engage in rather voluminous hedging opera-
tions (Davidson 1999:102). But - led by US financial
markets and exchanges - the great international wave of
speculation of the late 1990s made possible gains from
purely financial transactions which dwarfed the gains
to be made with traditional means of investing capital
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in the production and marketing of goods and services
at home.Between 1998 and 2001,German capital hold-
ings in the United States more than tripled (amounting
to 287 billion €) and grew to be higher than German
capital holdings in the EU (271,8 billion €). Of the in-
crease in the US (197,1 billion €, compared to net in-
vestments of 372,2 billion € in Germany), more than
half went into the financial sector (Bundesbank 2003:
57f). Once the bubble burst, gains proved to be based
on mere inflated monetary claims to shares of - world-
wide - real production. If they were to be transformed
into cash and actual purchases of real goods and servic-
es, a large part  turned out  to be fictitious. Speculative
increases in asset values present options on real wealth
whose value shrinks once too many want to use these
options9. But be that as it may, during the speculative
boom financial asset values increased dramatically
generating returns unattainable by traditional invest-
ments. Quite different from the USA, however, in Ger-
many these windfalls did not spill over into the real
economy where they would have increased aggregate
demand and thus induced strong general growth.
At the same time - and maybe as a collateral of par-
ticipating in international speculation - German cor-
porations increasingly switched to short term maxi-
mizing behavior, thus neglecting the social, ecological
or political consequences of their activities. Business
associations started a campaign questioning the viabil-
ity of producing competitively in Germany. Given the
background of relocations of some production sites, of
foreign investments and of the building of global value
creation chains by the global players of German origin,
the "Standortdebatte" (location debate) put real pres-
sure both on the shop floor and on the political system.
Especially big corporations were able to make their
threats to relocate credible. To prevent their use of the
exit option, the government – sometimes ill-guided
(Thelen 2000) - tried to push through "reforms":
Deregulation attempts were to enhance labour market
flexibility while cutbacks in welfare state programs
were to reduce the part of wage costs which was politi-
cally determined. Because of much resistance, not least
by the Social Democrats when the party was still in op-
position, these reforms took place in small steps only.
At the same time, unions had to make concessions,
comparatively minor ones with regard to wages, but
significant ones with respect to more flexible working
times and employment patterns. But all this was evi-
dently not sufficient to induce business to invest more
in Germany again.
8. Perspectives
Given the exit option of business and the possibili-
ties to withhold employment generating investment,
the government is in a squeeze, regardless of which
party or coalition rules. The risk of increasing unem-
ployment puts politicians under pressure to engage in
further cost-saving reforms, deregulation and privati-
zation - all in the name of enhancing competitiveness
in global markets. However, the fiscal crisis is real and
unabating, partly because the effective corporate tax
burden has been steadily reduced, partly because the
costs of unemployment remain high despite decreases
in individual benefits, and partly because unification
still demands considerable public West-East transfers.
Given the general – Bundesbank or ECB-lead and
Maastrich-treaty imposed - reluctance to increase the
public debt, there is no leeway for further tax reduc-
tions unless government spending is reduced.
From the side of the electorate, however, expecta-
tions are that traditional welfare state financed income
maintenance programs are upheld. Globalization or
not, cuts can only be gradual if whoever runs the gov-
ernment wants to be reelected. Dissatisfaction because
of the deteriorating cost-benefit balance of welfare
state programs is already widespread. Despite much
emphasis in the media on the necessity of switching to
private provision and insurance,however,a vast major-
ity of the population and organized labour continue to
hold the state to be responsible for social security.Thus,
politicians risk losing electoral support if they tolerate
more than incremental deterioration of traditional
welfare state programs.But continuing them and being
non-responsive to business demands (to lower wage
costs, cut back social security contributions,deregulate
and privatize) increases the risk that more and more
enterprises will not sufficiently invest or even com-
pletely choose the exit option, thus destroying the eco-
nomic feasibility even of reduced welfare state pro-
grams. It is no wonder that under these circumstances
"third ways" are so popular among politicians.
With or without “third ways”,what are the options to
get out of this squeeze? Of course, the underlying con-
flict between a population insisting on continued state
organized social protection and enterprises threaten-
9 This construction is similar to a model of modern automobile
traffic.On average,more than 90% of all cars are parked and me-
rely present mobility options. They are not usable without gene-
rating traffic congestions,which proves that complete mobility is
impossible.
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ing their exodus and exercising pressure by withhold-
ing investments can further escalate.Given the German
tradition of macroeconomic mercantilism,underwrit-
ten by all major political parties,business and unions, it
is highly unlikely, however, that such an escalation will
lead to a protectionist backlash against globalization.
The shared experience of (West-)Germans since World
War II is that an open, competitive economy brings
huge benefits for all.
Therefore, the escalating conflict will be about wel-
fare state programs and wages.To prevent such an esca-
lation, it should be possible to find a corridor of social
compromise by making use of the expected benefits of
globalization.Apart from the explosive growth of pure-
ly financial transactions in the last 20 years, globaliza-
tion is a rather slow,gradual process, so there should be
enough time to define such a corridor. Globalization
and technical progress based on highly skilled labour
can generate the additional economic means for social
policies likely to be demanded if some or all of the
feared negative effects of globalization will become re-
ality: Unemployment of the low-skilled, increased in-
equality of primary incomes and tax competition lim-
iting the financial leeway of governments. The last two
effects imply that financing social policy interventions
to compensate the losers of globalization may become
increasingly difficult because they involve new patterns
of redistribution. Since ambitious redistributive pro-
grams that would draw on income from capital to fi-
nance welfare state programs are not feasible given the
global exit option of capital, the remaining options for
financing compensations for globalization losers imply
cutting back those transfers which – under current
conditions - flow to globalization winners while im-
proving the targetting of transfers to the globalization
losers. This is a stony path. One important experience
from the era of welfare state expansion was that new
programs could be installed only if those not primarily
in need, the middle classes, were taken into the boat of
welfare state beneficiaries (Goodin/Le Grand 1987).To
take from the less needy in order to give to the needy is
likely to be much more difficult (Pierson 1994) than the
expansionary process of buying the assent of the less
needy by including them in programs originally in-
tended for the needy only. However, such difficulties
cannot legitimize the return to the politics of benign
neglect, to once again letting poverty grow and creating
new underclasses. Thus the political task is to convince
a sufficient share of the globalization winners that they
have to compensate the losers if they want to live in
"good" society.
It is unlikely,however, that the means to finance such
compensation will come forth voluntarily and equally
unlikely that it will be politically feasible for govern-
ments to simply increase the tax burden for relevant
parts of the population according to ability-to-pay cri-
teria. Instead, governments can propose attractive
medium term exchanges, if they can credibly establish
win-win-situations of the following type: Political sup-
port in terms of infrastructure, research funding and
subsidies for qualification and training is granted to
potential gainers of globalization,be they firms or indi-
viduals, in return for a share of these gains once they
actually accrue.These returns can then be used to com-
pensate the globalization losers,but the main emphasis
in this exchange should not lie on passive measures.
Rather, the number of such losers should be minimized
by supporting the growth of a highly qualified work
force.Thus, the state would be involved in a dual role: as
an organizer of innovative and transformative capacity,
which involves strong, reliable long-term support of
higher education and research,and – more traditional-
ly – as the welfare state insuring against risks of income
loss.
In general, the suggested strategy is analogous to
some schemes of financing higher education: The gov-
ernment grants cheap long-term credits to those at-
tending university and demands repayment once the
returns for the acquired human capital start to flow in
sufficient magnitude. Of course, the risks involved in
pursuing such a strategy vis-à-vis globalization are
considerable. Nobody can know with certainty which
innovations or qualifications will ultimately prove suc-
cessful. But although nobody anticipated the impact
and success of the internet, for example, the general di-
rection of changes towards the „knowledge economy“
or „knowledge society“ is a pretty safe bet. Apart from
that, here as elsewhere risk-pooling is a good strategy
and nation states still provide the biggest available risk-
pools.
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